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Abstract
Diffuse pollution from agriculture and extractive industries reduces air
and water quality and contributes to climate change. We consider a setting
in which a regulator must incentivize unobserved abatement given that firms
have limited liability, and when they can enter and exit. We demonstrate
that a simple dynamic incentive scheme can solve this difficult regulatory
problem: firms pay a constant tax and receive rebates following periods
of low pollution. We apply the model to water pollution from a fracking
operation and simulate the contract to explore the volatility of the firm’s
payments and the costs of limited liability.
1 Introduction
Diffuse pollution results from emissions that cannot be traced to their source. One
of the most significant impacts of these emissions is poor water quality. Runoff and
leaching from agriculture and mining can contaminate surface and ground water bodies
with excess nutrients (such as phosphorus and nitrogen) and toxic substances (such as
arsenic). This contamination increases infant mortality and digestive cancer (Brainerd
and Menon, 2014; Ebenstein, 2012) and is a major threat to natural assets such as
Chesapeake Bay, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Barrier Reef (GBRA, 2014; EPA,
2009). The regulation of diffuse emissions is complicated by a number of factors. First,
the emissions of any individual source are not observed. Second, ambient, or measurable,
pollution fluctuates with both random weather events and natural emissions and is
therefore stochastic. Finally, in practice regulators are required to take into account
“ability to pay” and are frequently constrained by statutory limits on penalties that
they can levy. The US EPA for example is constrained by maximum limits under the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act among others.
We characterize the primary regulatory problem as one of moral hazard. Moral
hazard arises because emissions are unobservable and because ambient pollution, which
is observed, is stochastic. The regulator (principal) must design the optimal set of
incentives to induce abatement from multiple polluters (firms). The regulator and firms
interact over an infinite horizon subject to the firms’ entry and exit decisions. These
firms are risk neutral but at any point in time they are limited by credit constraints
that are reflected in statutory limits on fines. The regulator is therefore constrained in
that transfers from each firm have a strict lower bound.
We demonstrate that the regulation of diffuse emissions would be feasible via the
combination of two simple incentive mechanisms: a constant tax flow and rebates that
depend on the history of pollution (ambient rebates). The constant tax flow respects the
lower bound constraint on the transfer flow, while the long run incentives provided by
the rebates ensure that firms have sufficient incentive to abate. By leveraging dynamic
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incentives, the regulator is able to ensure that firms abate even if the fines that can be
mandated are severely constrained in the short term.
We employ the continuous-time methods pioneered by Sannikov (2008) to solve the
moral hazard problem. We model the accumulation of pollution as a Brownian motion
whose drift is affected by the firms’ emissions. These firms can be thought of as drilling
sites with runoff that affects water quality. The nature of runoff and leakage means that
contaminants enter air or water at many unknown points, and neither the volume nor
the content contributed by an individual source can be measured. Firms can undertake
costly abatement actions, for example exert costly effort to maintain the integrity of
wells and containment ponds. It is either too costly to verify these actions or they are
unverifiable.
We assume restoration activities are not feasible and consider the special case where
it is optimal for the regulator to keep the stock of pollution constant, so that all active
firms must abate their emissions.1 More generally, one could imagine a setting in which
a social planner must determine the optimal abatement effort and the allocation of
that effort across firms. As long as the damage from emissions is sufficiently high, the
contract we outline will be the optimal solution to this social planner’s problem.
We compare the optimal contract and the firms’ expected payoffs to two bench-
marks: observable emissions and no transfer flow constraint. The setting with observ-
able emissions can be taken to represent the regulation of sources of emissions that can
be monitored; these sources are the focus of the vast bulk of current regulation. In
this benchmark, the regulator levies a tax on any firm that fails to abate equal to the
cost of their abatement. When emissions are not observed, but there is no constraint
on transfers to and from the firm, we show that a firm’s current payoff (i.e., not their
future payoff) is tied to the flow of pollution. If there is an arbitrarily large negative
shock to the pollution stock, a firm may then have to pay an arbitrarily large penalty.
We view this feature of the contract without a transfer flow constraint as unrealistic.
We derive the comparative statics of the effect of changes in the parameters determin-
1 Keohane et al. (2007) study a model in which the regulator is able to restore the stock of pollution
beside controlling its flow by inducing abatement; they show that periodic restoration of the stock
complements abatement of the flow of damages.
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ing the firms’ payoffs on the optimal contract and we apply the model to the problem of
water pollution from a fracking operation, demonstrating the impact of limited liability
on firm entry, exit and the cost of regulation across multiple scenarios.
Our paper intersects two independent literatures. The first is devoted to the regula-
tion of diffuse emissions (see Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead, 2013, for a recent survey).
Within this literature, the closest papers propose incentives that depend on the dif-
ference between the desired and realized aggregate ambient pollution stock. Segerson
(1988) first proposed a combination of per-unit and lump sum taxes and rebates in
a static environment. Subsequent extensions to dynamic and stochastic environments
were then undertaken by Xepapadeas (1992) and Athanassoglou (2010).
As convincingly argued by Karp (2005), there are two important barriers to the im-
plementation of this type of aggregate ambient taxation. First, when the evolution of
pollution is stochastic, the burden of transfers from individual firms may be large and
reasonably viewed as exceeding political or financial constraints. Second, the aggregate
burden of taxes may exceed the social cost of damage and lead to inefficient levels of
entry and exit. Unlike the optimal control models of Xepapadeas (1992) and Athanas-
soglou (2010), we find the contract that solves the regulator’s principal-agent problem
incorporating an exogenously given constraint on transfers from firms as well as firm
entry and exit. Despite the differences in our approach, the mechanism that solves this
problem shares some features of the original static scheme proposed by Segerson (1988).
Unlike Segerson’s proposal, however, in our solution taxation is always lump sum and
rebates are a function of dynamic rather than static performance.
The second literature is concerned with the management of environmental damage
in the presence of firms with limited liability. In the classic set-up a firm with limited
liability undertakes an environmentally risky activity and exerts costly but unobserved
safety care to reduce the probability of some severe environmental harm. A particular
concern of this literature is to what extent the judgment-proof problem can be amelio-
rated by extending liability to financiers and other stakeholders (Pitchford, 1995; Boyer
and Laffont, 1997; Hiriart and Martimort, 2006; Hiriart et al., 2011).2 Our setting differs
2 Empirically, Boomhower (2016) demonstrates that bankruptcy provisions, a form of limited liability,
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in that we consider multiple firms whose unobserved action is abatement rather than
safety precaution and where environmental damages are not limited to severe discrete
events. In this setting, we show that making use of dynamic incentives can alleviate
limited liability constraints in the regulation of environmentally damaging activities.
While others have adopted a principal-agent framework to study the regulation of
diffuse emissions in static environments (Chambers and Quiggin, 1996), we are the first
to do so in a dynamic, continuous time setting with a stochastic pollution flow. The
dynamic incentive regulation we propose is related to, but different from, the incentive
regulation of public utilities (for a survey, see Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The focus of the
literature on incentive regulation is to elicit cost information from a public utility; the
workhorse is a static, adverse selection model in which the public utility is a monopolist
with private information about its cost. We, on the other hand, study a model of
dynamic moral hazard.
Finally, our paper is related to the dynamic principal-agent literature. Dynamic
contracts can differ significantly to those in static settings, yet dynamic models that use
the standard optimal control approach can be intractable once one introduces realistic
features like limited liability and entry and exit. To overcome these difficulties, we
formulate our model as a dynamic continuous time agency problem using the tractable
machinery introduced by Sannikov (2008). The main technical advantage of his methods
is that the optimal contract can be found by solving an ordinary differential equation,
allowing for a detailed description of the optimal contract and for simple comparative
statics analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and Section 3
derives the optimal contract. Section 4 contains the comparative statics analysis of
the optimal contract. Section 5 simulates an application of the model to a fracking
operation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
have implications for firm size and environmental outcomes in the oil and gas industry.
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2 The Model
Consider an environmental regulator and a group of firms . The regulator must design
a contract to manage pollution within a statutory-imposed limit on the size of penalties
or levies and taking into account that firms make entry and exit decisions. Our focus
is on the form of this contract. In general, a social planner ought to choose the path of
abatement and a set of transfers that maximize social welfare by balancing the damage
of pollution with the costs of implementing any level of abatement by any firm at any
point in time. Solving such a problem quickly becomes intractable. Here we study an
important special case when a) each active firm chooses only whether to pollute or abate
all their emissions and b) it is optimal for pollution to remain constant and hence for
the planner to induce all active firms to abate at every point in time.3 Our approach
allows us to focus on the structure of the dynamic incentives and to study entry and
exit; the cost of assuming a binary abatement choice is that we must abstract from a
detailed investigation of the optimal path of abatement.
In this setting, potential firms decide whether to enter the industry and if they have
entered they decide whether to exit. At a random time ti0, firm i gets a chance to enter;
it enters if the total expected value of entry is greater than its outside option R. Firm
i exits at time T i if its expected continuation value of staying in the regulated industry
is below R.4
Let N be the set of potential firms and Nt Ď N be the set of firms that have entered
by time t; Nt is the cardinality of Nt, or the number of firms that have entered by t.
All firms are risk neutral. Firm i generates a profit flow pii; that is, in a time period of
length dt expected profit is piidt. In the absence of costly abatement, the operations of
the firms affect pollution flow.
Polluting firms could be mining operations, drilling sites, or farms with runoff that
3 These restrictions ensure that each firm’s optimal abatement action is independent of the other firms’
actions and of the pollution stock. One can show that abatement is optimal if it is assumed that the
social cost of pollution is sufficiently high. Henceforth, we will maintain such an assumption and view
abatement by all firms that are active as the socially optimal outcome.
4 The assumption that firms do not enter if they expect just to make their outside option R and that
once they have entered they do not exit when they just make R can be easily justified with the presence
of small entry and exit costs.
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affects water quality or with leaks that emit methane and other gases. To fix ideas,
consider an unconventional drilling operation such as hydraulic fracturing of fracking.5
Fracking can contaminate ground water and local water bodies if gases and fluids migrate
from wells and containment ponds (Kuwayama et al., 2015). In a deterministic world
abatement such as well and pond maintenance could eliminate pollution, but due to
random weather events and natural concentrations, actual pollution is stochastic. Firms’
hidden abatement actions only control the drift or expected volume of pollution, they
do not have the ability to control the realized flow of pollution.
Active firms choose whether to pollute or abate. Hence we model firm i at time t
as choosing an abatement action ait P t0, 1u. When firm i abates in a time period of
length dt, it incurs an abatement cost cidt. We allow the abatement flow costs ci to
differ across firms and assume that pii ą ci so that it is still profitable for every firm to
produce while abating. The change in the pollution stock is a function of each firm’s
abatement choice.
We specify the flow of pollution, or change in pollution stock, dYt in the time interval
rt´ dt, ts as:
dYt “ µtdt` σdZt (1)
The actions of the firms determine the expected flow of pollution µt. Abatement in
the time interval rt ´ dt, ts determines the expected change in the pollution stock µtdt
in rt ´ dt, ts. The change in pollution stock also depends on an exogenous shock to
pollution arising from random weather events such as precipitation, that affect the flow
of pollution measured by the regulator; this is captured by the standard Brownian
motion term dZt. Viewing Brownian motion as the limit of a symmetric random walk
and taking ∆ “ ?dt, we can think that, due to exogenous random factors, the stock
of pollution in the time interval rt ´ dt, ts increases by σ∆ with probability 0.5 and
decreases by the same amount with probability 0.5. Thus, σ measures the volatility of
the exogenous shock to pollution.
5 Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, involves fracturing underground rock and shale formations using
a chemical/water mixture to release oil and gas resources that would be inaccessible using traditional
extraction techniques.
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DefineMt Ď Nt as the set and Mt as the number of firms that have entered but are
not polluting at time t. Firms who have entered include those who are still active and
those who have exited. Firms not polluting at time t are firms who have exited, and
firms who are abating. Thus, the set of polluting firms at time t is Pt “ NtzMt and Pt
is the number of them. The expected flow of pollution µt is given by:
µt “ α pPtq (2)
where αp¨q is an increasing function, i.e, P 1t Ă Pt implies α pPtq ě α pP 1tq, satisfying
αp∅q “ 0, so that if no firms are polluting in time interval rt´dt, ts, the drift of pollution
is µtdt “ 0. If only firm i pollutes then the drift of pollution is µt “ αptiuq “ Ai; that
is, the expected change in of pollution in time interval rt ´ dt, ts is Aidt. While we
do not explicitly model pollution decay, our model is isomorphic to a model in which
pollution decays at rate ρdt and firms abate an amount pAi´ρqdt.6 The firm’s flow cost
of abatement is a function of the level of pollution it abates, given by ci “ λAi.
The regulator observes the change in the pollution stock dYt, but the abatement
choices of firms are hidden by the noise created by the Brownian motion. The higher
the level of volatility σ, the less information the regulator can deduce from the observed
flow dYt. Note that this flow is independent of the stock of pollution Yt; it only depends
on the firms’ abatement actions and random shocks.
The regulator may motivate each firm to abate with transfers and the threat of
shutdown. In each time interval rt ´ dt, ts, the transfer dIit can either be from the
regulator to a firm (dIit ą 0) or vice versa from a firm to the regulator (dIit ă 0). The
next section focuses on determining the form of dIit . Given this transfer, the payoff to
the firm from their abatement choice ait evolves according to:
dΠitpaitq “ ppii ´ ciaitqdt` dIit (3)
If firm i chooses to abate in time interval rt´dt, ts then the flow of its payoff in the time
6 Pollution decay is an important feature of many ambient pollution problems (e.g., methane and water
pollution).
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interval is ppii ´ ciqdt ` dIit . The regulator is constrained by statute and must ensure
that transfers from the firm do not exceed a lower bound dIit ě ´τdt. This constraint
acts as a limited liability constraint by putting an upper bound on the amount that the
regulator can force a firm to pay at any instant.
If firm i enters at time ti0 then it must be the case that the total expected payoff of the
contract to the firm is greater than its outside option. Let W it be firm i’s continuation
value, or the firm’s total expected discounted payoff from time t, conditional on not
having exited (i.e., not having exercised its outside option) prior to t. This firm’s total
expected payoff at time t is the discounted expected value of all future instantaneous
payoffs dΠis and depends on its abatement actions over time a
i
s. Taking the continuous
time limit of dt converging to zero, we can write firm i’s total expected payoff at t as:
W it “ Et
«
expγt
ż T i
t
exp´γs dΠispaisq ` exp´γpT i´tqR
ff
(4)
where the expectation Et is taken at time t and firms discount at rate γ. This firm exits
at endogenously chosen time T i when they exercise their outside option R (for example
transferring business to another state).
The regulator’s mandate is to keep the expected stock of pollution constant at the
initial level Y0. The regulator uses taxes and rebates in order to maximize a weighted
social welfare function. The regulator places a weight of 1 on the cost of providing
firms with incentives to abate at each point in time, and a weight of p1´ φq P r0, 1s on
the initial discounted payoff, or promised utility level, W i
ti0
, of each firm i. The smaller
weight attached to the firms’ payoff reflects either the greater importance attached to
consumer surplus, or the social cost of raising funds.7 Thus, the regulator’s problem is
to maximize:
b0 “
»—–ÿ
iPN
E0
»—–T
iż
ti0
´ exp´rs dIis ` p1´ φqWti0
fiffifl
fiffifl (5)
by choosing dIis and Wti0
subject to the transfer flow constraints dIit ě ´τdt and to the
7 Under the latter interpretation, one can decompose the weight attached to the transfers into a com-
ponent having the same weight 1´ φ as the firms’ payoff and the flow cost of raising funds φdIt.
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incentive constraints that it is optimal for each firm i to select ait “ 1 for all t ă T i.
The regulator discounts at rate r ă γ and is thus more patient than the firms,
reflecting the fact that the regulator cares more about future generations than does any
firm.
3 The Optimal Contract
We begin by discussing how the regulator chooses payments dIit . We then go on to discuss
Wti0
- the value offered to a firm when they consider entering. When the regulator does
not observe the actions of the firms that have entered, it must incentivize each firm i to
abate by linking dIit to what is observed, the flow of pollution dYt. Given the repeated
setting, the optimal contract could tie each firm’s payoff to the entire history of pollution
at time t. This makes the regulator’s problem potentially very complex. However, as
first shown by Spear and Srivastava (1987) in a discrete time principal-agent setting, the
principal’s problem can be reduced to a recursive problem with the continuation value,
or expected future payoff, of the agent as a state variable.
As a state variable, the expected future payoff W it summarizes all relevant informa-
tion about the entire history of firm i’s actions up to time t – it serves as a dynamic rating
of the firm’s past performance as well as their expected future payoff. If W it is a dynamic
rating of past performance, changes in it must be tied to the flow of pollution. Let dW it
be the change in promised utility in time period rt ´ dt, ts. We can then think that in
time period rt ´ dt, ts firm i obtains its instantaneous payoff dΠit “ ppii ´ ciaiqdt ` dIit
and its promised payoff change dW it . From the point of view of the regulator dW
i
t and
the instantaneous transfer dIit can be viewed as substitute incentive tools to provide
firm i with incentives to abate. The availability of two tools in a dynamic setting proves
extremely important when the regulator is faced with constraints on the instantaneous
transfer.
More precisely, we may view ofW it as a performance rating that determines the future
payments to the firm and dW it as a change in the expected, contracted payments the firm
is promised to receive in the future, contingent on the pollution state. As we shall see, in
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the optimal contract we can think that the firm holds a pollution derivative with index
W it that pays out once its value reaches a pre-determined threshold. Under abatement,
the value of the index W it depends purely on changes in the pollution stock which are
driven by random natural fluctuations. In this sense, we can think of the contract as
similar to a weather derivative whose index is a function of ambient temperature, and
that pays out to the holder of the derivative if that index surpasses an agreed threshold.8
3.1 The Tax Rate and the Firms’ Outside Option
Before we go on to specify how a firm’s performance rating evolves over time, we need to
consider the implications of firm exit for the regulator’s problem. When a firm’s abate-
ment action is unobservable and the regulator is constrained by a transfer constraint,
the regulator punishes pollution by lowering the firm’s current performance rating and
simultaneously lowering their promised future transfers dIit . As we shall see, this implies
that firms’ promised payoffs evolve with shocks to pollution, and there is a risk that they
exit if their future promised value falls below their outside option.
The exit of any active firm is privately and socially inefficient as the regulator will
ensure that every firm abates all their emissions (i.e., causes no social damage) and
the firm’s profit net of its cost of abatement is positive. The regulator values the firm,
however the threat of forcing the firm to exit is important to provide incentives to abate
in the vicinity of the outside option. Rather than exiting, the firm could instead decide
to stop abating forever. By doing so firm i could guarantee itself a payoff flow at least
equal to pii´ τ and a discounted continuation payoff of pii´τγ . If this discounted payoff is
higher than firm i’s outside option payoff R, then the threat of forcing the firm to exit is
not effective and the regulator cannot prevent the firm from polluting when the promised
utility in the contract falls below pi
i´τ
γ . To put it differently, to control pollution the
regulator must be able to force a firm to exit or abate. But the regulator cannot push
the promised payoff W i below pi
i´τ
γ . Thus, avoiding pollution requires that the outside
8 Weather derivatives have been traded in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange since 1999.
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option satisfies the constraint
R ą pi
i ´ τ
γ
(6)
At the same time, it must be the case that it is socially beneficial for the firm to enter
and abate forever rather than to take their outside option. Hence it must be the case
that
R ď pi
i ´ ci
γ
(7)
We combine these two inequalities in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A necessary condition for firm i either abating or exiting, but never polluting
is:
τ ą pii ´ γR ě ci (8)
Lemma 1 provides a lower bound on the maximum levy flow set by the legislature.
Specifically, the maximum tax flow τ must be greater than the difference between firm
i’s profit flow pii and the flow value of their outside option γR. For each firm, the
maximum levy flow must also be weakly greater than its cost of abatement. Henceforth,
we will assume that condition (8) holds for each firm i.
3.2 The Evolution of the Firms’ Values
To guarantee that firm i abates, the regulator must ensure that the total benefit that they
receive from abating is greater than the total benefit they receive from polluting. But
the regulator cannot observe firms’ chosen actions, it observes only the noisy signal dYt.
Each firm’s total benefit includes its current payoff and its future payoff. For incentive
compatibility, one or both of these payoffs must be linked to the realization of pollution.
Define the instantaneous reward of firm i in period rt´ dt, ts as ppii´ ciqdt` dIit ` dW it ,
the sum of the instantaneous payoff when abating and the change in their promised
utility.
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Thinking of the promised utility as a perpetuity leads to the intuitive conclusion that,
in the absence of changes in pollution, the instantaneous reward, viewed as a periodic
payment, ought to be equal to γW it dt, the discount rate times the present value of the
perpetuity. The next lemma shows that in the optimal contract with random shocks
to pollution the regulator provides incentives to each firm i by tying the instantaneous
reward to the flow of pollution; increasing it above the periodic perpetuity payment
γW it dt if pollution decreases and decreasing it if pollution increases.
9 In addition, as
a long series of pollution shocks that decrease the firm i’s promised utility is possible,
their promised utility could become as low as their outside option. When this occurs
firm i exits.
Lemma 2. At time t ă T i there is a sensitivity βit of each firm i’s instantaneous reward
to the flow of pollution such that:
ppii ´ ciqdt` dIit ` dW it “ γW it dt` βitdYt (9)
where
βit ď ´λ (10)
The instantaneous reward follows this process as long as t ă T i where T i is the first
time at which W it ă R.
The proof of (9) is provided in the appendix. Here we prove why (10) must hold.
To ensure that each firm abates, the instantaneous reward must be linked to the flow
of pollution dYt and to the past performance measure given by the promised utility. The
parameter βit governs how sensitive firm i’s instantaneous reward is to the signal dYt.
In other words, it governs how firm i’s present and future payments change with the
observed flow of pollution. To demonstrate that βit ď ´λ we focus on a firm’s incentives
to abate. We look for a Nash equilibrium among the firms, that is, we consider a firm’s
incentives to abate conditional on all other active firms choosing to abate. For incentive
compatibility it is sufficient to derive conditions under which firm i chooses ait “ 1 at
9 The conclusion does not depend on whether the transfer constraint is due to limited liability, or tax
policy.
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any arbitrary moment in time.
At time t a firm i must balance its payoff from deviating today with the reduction
in its payoff tomorrow. The firm wishes to maximize the expected change in W it plus
their current payoff. By (9), under the terms of the contract, and assuming all other
firms abate, if firm i chooses abatement, then µt “ 0 and their continuation value will
evolve according to dW it `dIit “ γW it dt´ppii´ciqdt`βitσdZt. If they instead choose not
to abate they gain the avoided cost of abatement cidt but the regulator will lower their
promised utility. The firm’s failure to abate affects the expected flow of pollution, which
becomes µt “ Ai and their expected future payoff changes by d
`
W it ` dIit
˘D “ γW it dt´
ppii´ ciqdt`βitpAidt`σdZtq.10 The regulator must ensure that the change in the firm’s
payoff from deviating (not abating at time t) is negative; that is d
`
W it ` dIit
˘D` cidt ď
dW it ` dIit , or:
βitA
idt` cidt ď 0.
The first term, βitA
idt, reflects the change to the firm’s promised payoff. The second
term is the immediate gain to firm i from not abating, the avoided cost of abatement
cidt. Using ci “ λAi and re-arranging:
βit ď ´λ
Hence, for a positive pollution flow dYt firm i’s promised payoff must fall by at least
λdYt to ensure that firm i abates.
3.3 The Incentive Scheme
Lemma 9 provides a constraint on the two incentive tools that the regulator can use
at any point in time, the transfer dIit and the change in the promised utility dW
i
t . As
incentive instruments they are perfect substitutes from the point of view of the firm,
as they enter linearly in the instantaneous reward of the firm. We shall now show that
10 The presence of the term ppii ´ ciqdt in the expression of the evolution of the promised value reflects
the fact that the regulator cannot observe the deviation and hence adjusts the promised value for the
cost of abatement even if the firm shirks.
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they are not perfect substitutes from the point of view of the regulator.
Define Wt as the vector of continuation payoffs for all the firms at time t. In order
to determine the preferences of the regulator over the two incentive tools at her disposal,
we need to characterize the regulator’s expected value from the promised payoffs Wt.
Denote by bpWtq the regulator’s value function; that is, the highest payoff that the
regulator can obtain from a set of contracts that induce all firms to abate and that
provide the set of firms with a profile of promised utilities Wt. Consider also the case
of treating firms separately, dealing with each firm i as if all other firms abate. Denote
by f ipW it q the regulator’s value function from firm i; that is, the highest payoff that the
regulator can obtain from a contract that induces firm i to abate and that provides firm
i with promised utility W it , under the assumption that all other firms abate.
Lemma 3.
(a) The regulator’s value function bpWq is separable in the firms’ promised utilities
W i; i.e., bpWq “ ři f ipW iq;
(b) The regulator’s value function f ipW iq from firm i is strictly concave in the interval
rR,xW is, where the threshold utility xW i satisfies:
pii ´ ci “ γxW i ` r ´f ipxW iq ´ p1´ φqxW i¯ (11)
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 3 (a) shows that the regulator’s value function is separable and can be written
as the sum of the individual value functions f ipW iq for each firm i. Intuitively, this
is because linking the incentive schemes of different firms provides no benefit to the
regulator in our setting. Lemma 3 (b) shows that each value function f i for firm i is
strictly concave for values of the promised utility between the outside option value R and
the threshold xW i. The threshold xW i represents the point at which the flow value of firm
i’s production (profit minus abatement cost) is equal to the flow value the firm derives
from the contract plus the flow value of the regulator net of the value the regulator
obtains from the firm’s profit.
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Lemma 3 allows us to specify the optimal contract and incentive payments. Propo-
sition 1 outlines their form.
Proposition 1.
(a) When firm i enters at time t “ ti0, the regulator chooses a starting promised utility
W i
ti0
, with R ăW i
ti0
ď xW i, where the threshold utility xW i satisfies (11).
(b) The regulator chooses βit “ ´λ as the sensitivity of firm i’s instantaneous reward
to the flow of pollution.
(c) If at time t ą ti0 it is W it ă xW i, then the regulator provides incentive payments:
dIit “ ´τdt (12)
dW it “ τdt` γW it dt´ ppii ´ ciqdt´ λdYt (13)
(d) If at time t ą ti0 it is W it “ xW i, then the regulator provides incentive payments:
dIit “ max
!
´τdt, γxW idt´ ppii ´ ciqdt´ λdYt) (14)
dW it “ min
!
0, γxW idt´ ppii ´ ci ´ τqdt´ λdYt) (15)
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (a) places intuitive bounds on the promised utility W i
ti0
that the firm
is offered when it enters the market. For now we take the starting value W i
ti0
of each
firm i as given; it will be pinned down in the next subsection.
Proposition 1 (b) reflects the fact that an increase in the sensitivity of firm i’s instan-
taneous reward to the flow of pollution increases the volatility of the incentive payments
from the regulator to the firm. As the regulator’s value function is concave in promised
utility, the regulator dislikes variability and hence selects the smallest size of βit (i.e.,
βit “ ´λ) that incentivizes the firm to abate.
The concavity of the value function also implies that for low values of the promised
utility lowering the transfer payment of the firm as much as possible is optimal (Propo-
sition 1 (c)), while for high values of the promised utility it is optimal for the regulator
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to lower the change in promised utility as much as possible (Proposition 1 (d)). The
threshold xW i represents the cutoff promised utility level at which the regulator switches
from using long-run incentives to using short-run incentives. In other words, at promised
utility xW i, the regulator switches from (a) keeping dIit as low as possible and linking
dW it to changes in the pollution stock, to (b) keeping dW
i
t as low as possible and linking
dIit to changes in the pollution stock.
Figures 1 and 2 depict a stylized example of a regulator’s value function and the
contract linking the firm’s payoff to pollution flow. Consider a decrease in pollution.
The regulator wants to reward firms. They can either reward them instantaneously
with a transfer (dIit ą 0) or they can increase the promised future reward by raising
the pollution derivative that pays out when reaching a given threshold, (dW it ą 0). The
cost of rewarding the firm instantaneously is always ´φ, the cost of raising the transfer
dIit . The cost of rewarding the firm in the future is f
i
W it
which is the shadow price, or
marginal regulator’s benefit, of an increase in the promised utility dW it . The regulator
is more patient than the firm, so paying firms sooner rather than later is beneficial.
However, when the stock of future rewards (i.e., W it ) is low, the risk of a firm exiting is
relatively high. The regulator can lower the risk that the firm exits by promising future
rewards. Hence when f i
W it
ą ´φ in Figure 1, dW it is linked to changes in pollution stock
in Figure 2. However, as the stock of future rewards increases, the probability of exit
falls, and the cost of delaying the reward dominates. The threshold xW is exactly the
point at which the cost of using current and future rewards is equal and the regulator
switches from promising future rewards to a current rebate. Hence in Figure 1, when
f i
W it
“ ´φ, dIit is linked to changes in the pollution stock in Figure 2. Now consider
an increase in pollution. The regulator wants to punish firms in this instance, but they
face the limited liability constraint. However, the regulator can still punish the firm by
reducing the stock of future rewards. If necessary the regulator will force the firm to exit
because the stock of rewards is not as attractive as the firm’s outside option (W it “ R).
Because of the lower bound on the transfer flow that the regulator can charge the
firm, when W it ă xW i the regulator sets dIit “ ´τ , which can be interpreted as a constant
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tax flow. Hence in any time period rt´ dt, ts the firm pays the regulator a constant fee
or flat tax τdt. On the other hand, the regulator never lets the promised utility go above
the threshold xW it . When the promised utility reaches the threshold level, the contract
provides flow rebates following negative pollution shocks. If there is a negative pollution
shock in period rt´ dt, ts when the promised utility is at the threshold, the firm obtains
a rebate τdt´ dIit ą 0 in addition to paying the flat tax ´τdt. We call this an ambient
rebate to reflect the fact that firms’ receipt of rebates depend on the history of the flow
of pollution.
To summarize, when W it ă xW i it is cheaper for the regulator to motivate firm i by
allowing the promised utility W it to increase. When firm i’s promised utility reaches
xW i
it is cheaper for the regulator to reward the firm with a rebate in the present instead of
promising a larger rebate in the future.
3.4 The Firms’ Starting Value and Entry
We now go on to determine the firm’s starting value and their entry decision. At time
ti0 the regulator offers potential entrant i a contract with promised payoff W
i
ti0
. Since
f ipW iq is concave there is a unique value W i˚ that maximizes f ipW iq. The regulator
therefore chooses W i
ti0
“W i˚ and the firm enters if and only if W i˚ ą R. Thus, in effect,
if the regulator’s value function for firm i is decreasing in rR,xW is, then the regulator
blocks the firm’s entry by offering a contract that yields the outside option payoff as the
firm’s starting value, but does not cover any, however small, entry cost.
3.5 Benchmarks and Extensions
To highlight the implication of hidden actions in the design of the contracts, we next out-
line the incentive scheme the regulator would offer if the firms’ actions were observable.
We then consider the optimal contract if there were no constraints on the instantaneous
transfers that the firms can be asked to pay and the optimal contract in a static setting.
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3.5.1 Observable Actions
The case of observable actions is a useful analytic benchmark, and also represents the
regulation of point sources, those who are the target of the majority of current environ-
mental regulation. The optimal contract offered by the regulator to firm i specifies a
transfer dIit and recommends the abatement actions a
i
t “ 1 for all t and i. When the
regulator observes whether or not firm i abates in “instant” dt, then it can condition
the payments on the observed action.
If the firm does not abate, then the regulator can fine the firm up to the maximum
amount; that is, it can set pdIit |ait “ 0q ě ´τdt. If φ ą 0, then the regulator loses from
any transfer to the firm and will choose the lowest possible transfer, (dIit |ait “ 0q “ ´τdt.
For incentive compatibility, that is to guarantee that the firm wants to abate, it must
be that the transfer when the firm does abate minus the cost of abating are at least
as large as the transfer when not abating. Formally, it must be pdIit |ait “ 1q ´ cidt ě
pdIit |ait “ 0q “ ´τdt. Again, if φ ą 0, the regulator prefers transfers as low as possible,
so they will pick pdIit |ait “ 1q “ pci ´ τqdt.
Thus the optimal contract will specify pdIit |ait “ 0q “ ´τdt and pdIit |ait “ 1q “
pci ´ τqdt. With this contract, firm i always abates.11 Without lump sum transfers,
then firm i’s promised utility would simply be the discounted value of the flow of profit
minus the cost of abatement and the transfer flow or: W i
ti0
“ pii´τγ . An extra dollar
paid by the firm to the regulator costs the regulator 1´φ in reduced payoff to the firm.
The regulator thus benefits from a transfer from the firm; net of any small entry cost to
induce entry, the regulator charges the firm a lump sum transfer that puts its promised
utility at R.
3.5.2 No Transfer Constraint
We now outline the features of the contract in the alternative benchmark case when there
is no constraint on the transfer flow from the firm. A key difference in the contract is
that when there is no transfer constraint, the regulator can make sure that the firm
11 If φ “ 0, then any contract with pdIit |ait “ 1q ´ cidt ě pdIit |ait “ 0q ě ´τdt will induce the firm to
abate and yields the same payoff to the regulator.
18
never exits. As outlined in Proposition 2, the unconstrained regulator uses the current
transfer flow to reward abatement and punish pollution. Thus, each firm will have to
pay arbitrarily large fee flows after an arbitrarily large positive shock that increases
pollution. Since such shocks are bound to occur, the optimal contract of the model with
no transfer constraints does not seem appealing or practical.12
Proposition 2. If there are no constraints on the instantaneous transfer flow between
the regulator and firm i, then:
(a) at ti0 the regulator offers the firm the starting value W
i
ti0
“ R and pays the firm
any entry cost, so that the firm enters;13
(b) for all t ą ti0 firm i’s promised value is constant at R;
(c) for all t ą ti0 the regulator pays the firm according to the incentive scheme dIit “
pγR´ ppii ´ ciqqdt` βidYt with βi ď ´λ ;
(d) the regulator’s value is rf ipRq “ pii ´ ci ` p1´ φqrR´ γR.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix.
3.5.3 A Static Setting
Had we adopted a static, or more precisely single-period, version of our model, it would
not have been possible to study entry and exit by firms. The regulator would not have
been constrained by the threat of exit of a socially efficient firm and the promise of future
payments would not have been available as a tool to incentivize a firm to abate. The
only way in which the regulator could have incentivized a firm to abate is by linking their
reward to the pollution generated in the period. This could be accomplished by taxing
the firm the maximum amount allowed by the firm’s limited liability if the pollution
stock at the end of the period is above a threshold and paying a bonus if it is below it.
12 In the environmental, optimal control, literature, it is standard to assume that there are no transfer
constraints, see Karp (2005) for a discussion.
13 The regulator benefits from the firm entering, but it also benefits from reducing the firm’s starting
value. If we do not allow the regulator to induce entry by paying the firm’s entry cost and we maintain
the assumption that the firm does not enter if offered a starting value of R, then the problem has no
solution, as the regulator wants to induce entry and to choose W i
ti0
as close as possible to R.
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One of the main insights of our paper is that in a dynamic setting the optimal
contract also has the simple feature of charging the firm the maximum flow rate and of
rewarding with rebates, but the rebates are tied to the promised utility, a measure of
the industry’s past abatement performance, not the pollution stock.
3.6 Parameter Uncertainty
The optimal contract of each firm depends on parameters of the firm’s payoff that could
be unknown or private information of the firm. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to add the problem of screening for hidden information to the hidden action problem
(pollution abatement) that is the focus of our analysis. It is however useful to point
out the robustness of the optimal contract. First, if there is uncertainty about the true
value of the unit abatement cost λ, then the regulator could guarantee that abatement
still takes place by choosing the sensitivity ´βi of the contract to the pollution flow to
be equal to the highest value in the range of λ. As indicated by (10) in Lemma 2, as
long as ´βi ě λ the firm will abate.
Second, uncertainty about the cost of abatement ci (via either uncertainty in λ or
Ai) and the profit flow pii affects the rebates paid to the firm when the threshold xW i is
reached. Overestimating the profit flow or underestimating the abatement cost means
that the promised utility specified in the contract is higher than the true expected future
payoff of the firm; as a result the firm would tend to exit earlier. To avoid inefficient
exit, it is again advantageous for the regulator to err on the cautious side and choose
rebates for a profit flow on the low side of its possible range and an abatement cost on
the high side of its range.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section we study the impact of changes in the parameters determining a firm’s
payoff on the optimal contract offered to that firm by the regulator.
We look at the effects on the regulator’s value function f ipW iq (i.e., the expected
future accumulation of net tax receipts from firm i) for all possible values of the promised
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utility W i, the effects on the firm’s maximum promised utility xW i (i.e., the threshold
promised utility at which the firm is paid a bonus in case of a negative shock to pollution)
and the effects on the firm’s starting promised utility W i˚.
Proposition 3. For each firm i the following effects hold.
(a) At all levels of the firm’s current promised utility W i, the regulator’s value is: piq
increasing in the transfer constraint τ , the outside option payoff R and the profit
flow pii; piiq decreasing in the volatility of pollution σ, the discount rate γ, the level
of abatement Ai and the unit cost of abatement λ.
(b) The threshold promised utility xW i is: piq increasing in the volatility of pollution
σ and the profit flow pii; piiq decreasing in the transfer constraint τ , the outside
option payoff R, the discount rate γ and the level of abatement Ai.
(c) The starting promised utility W i˚ is: piq increasing in the outside option payoff R
and the profit flow pii; piiq decreasing in the transfer constraint τ , the discount rate
γ and the level of abatement Ai.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix.
An increase in the firm’s profit flow pii has a similar effect to a reduction in the
abatement level Ai. They are beneficial for both firm and regulator, as they reduce the
cost of providing long-run incentives. An increase in the firm’s profit flow or a reduction
in the needed abatement level allow the regulator to reduce the bonus payment to the
firm when the promised utility reaches the threshold xW i and thus make it convenient
to rely for a longer time on long-run incentives by increasing the threshold xW i.
It is not surprising that an increase in the maximum instantaneous transfer τ that the
firm can pay increases the regulator’s value f ipW iq at all levels of the state variable W i.
What is perhaps more surprising is that the increase in τ harms the firm, by lowering
the starting value of the promised utility W i˚. Intuitively, an increase in how much the
firm may be taxed in each period reduces the cost of providing short-run incentives.
This is also reflected in a reduction of the maximum level of long-run incentives, the
threshold xW i, leading to the firm being paid bonuses earlier. It would seem that firm
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and regulator could both benefit when providing short-run incentives is easier, but this
is not so, because the regulator gains from taxing the firm, irrespective of the incentive
motive.
An increase in the unit cost of abatement λ has two effects; it increases the bonus
that the firm must be paid at xW i and also increases the magnitude of the sensitivity
βit “ ´λ of firm i’s instantaneous reward to changes in the pollution stock. Both effects
have a negative impact on the regulator’s value, which is thus decreasing in the unit
cost of abatement. The first effect pushes towards a decrease in the threshold promised
utility xW i, while the second pushes towards its increase. The combined effect depends
on the curvature of the regulator’s value function and is ambiguous. For similar reasons,
the impact of an increase in the unit cost of abatement on the firm’s starting value W i˚
is also ambiguous.
The regulator’s value is decreasing in the volatility of pollution σ (consistent with
the concavity of the regulator’s value function), reflecting the fact that this volatility
makes the signal dYt a poorer indication of the firms’ actions, making it harder to
provide the firm with incentives to abate. As pollution becomes more volatile, the
firm’s promised utility also does and thus it is beneficial, in order to delay exit, to raise
the threshold promised utility xW i which triggers bonus payments to the firm. The effect
on the starting value of the firm is however ambiguous, as it depends on changes in the
curvature of the regulator’s value function.
An increase in the firms’ outside option payoff R is directly beneficial to the regulator,
as it increases the regulator’s payoff when the firm exits. It is thus not surprising that
it raises the regulator’s value at all levels of the promised utility to the firm and that it
also benefits the firm by raising the starting value W i˚. The reason why it reduces the
threshold promised utility xW i is also intuitive. As the firm’s exit is a smaller loss, the
regulator is willing to risk an earlier exit by reducing its reliance on long-run incentives.
Finally, the regulator’s value is decreasing in the firm’s discount rate γ. If the firm
is more impatient, then the regulator’s use of the short-run incentive of a tax in the
present is more costly for the firm and the long-run incentive of future rebates is less
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effective. The firm is also worse off, as the starting promised utlity of a less patient firm
is lower. In addition, since long-run incentives are less effective, relying on them is less
valuable to the regulator and the threshold promised utility xW i also decreases.
5 Numerical Application to Fracking
In this section we use a numerical application of the model to demonstrate how the
limited liability constraint generates inefficiency. There are several ways in which the
transfer constraint is costly. First, firms may not enter. Second, once they have entered,
firms may exit after a series of positive pollution shocks. Finally, because they are
less patient than the regulator, rewarding firms in the future is relatively more costly,
yet the regulator uses future promises to reward current abatement and to manage the
possibility of exit. We provide an example of each of these channels using an application
to water pollution caused by a fracking operation.
The unconventional gas industry, and in particular the practice of fracking, has
been associated with contamination of natural waterways and potable water supplies
(Kuwayama et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2012). We assume that a fracking firm operates
in the vicinity of a waterway and that leakage of flowback water containing bromide
from the firm’s operations can pollute this waterway if there is inadequate monitoring
and maintenance of containment ponds and other facilities. The volatility of bromide is
driven by precipitation and naturally occurring deposits. The regulator can only observe
bromide concentrations at a downstream water quality monitor.
5.1 Scenario Parameters
In Table 1 we outline parameters for four scenarios. In each scenario we consider a single
firm and rescale time such that ti0 “ 0. Henceforth we drop the superscript i. Across
scenarios we assume that the expected impact of flowback water on levels of bromide
ranges from A “ 0.005 to A “ 0.05 mg/L. For reference, Wilson and Van Briesen (2013)
find bromide concentrations of between 0.05 and 0.09 mg/L in the Monongahela River,
a river potentially affected by fracking in the Marcellus shale. The lower bound of the
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range we assume is lower than the 0.01 mg/L detection limit in that study. The upper
bound of the range is the EPA’s maximum containment load for bromide. We assume
that the volatility of pollution ranges from σ “ 0.025 to σ “ 0.03 mg/L. The standard
deviation of bromide concentrations in the Monongahela River was found to be high:
ranging from 0.04 to 0.09 across testing sites.
The firm’s profit is parameterized to approximate daily net revenue of fracking oper-
ations cited in the media and does not vary across scenarios.14 Similarly, the unit cost of
abatement (λ) is held fixed across scenarios leading to total abatment costs (c) of $195
to $1950. To parameterize the unit cost of abatement (monitoring and maintenance
effort) we assume that it takes one full time employee to reduce pollution by 0.01 mg/L.
We take the average wage for the gas industry in Pennsylvania from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics to then calculate an approximate unit abatement cost at the daily level
(see Cruz et al., 2014).
5.2 Results
For each scenario we numerically solve for the optimal contract to keep levels of bromide
constant. This provides us with the rebate threshold xW and the regulator’s value at the
threshold fpxW q, both reported in Table 2. The solution to the regulator’s problem also
gives the starting values W0 “ W˚ for the firm and fpW0q “ fpW˚q for the regulator.
We then apply Proposition 2 to calculate expected firm and regulator outcomes in the
case with no transfer constraint.
We start by highlighting the two cases where limited liability inefficiently deters
entry. Table 2 shows that in both Scenarios 2 and 3, the regulator’s value is maximized
at the outside option of the firm and thus the regulator offers the firm W0 “ R.15 Thus
with any small positive entry cost, the firm decides not to enter. The only difference
between Scenarios 2 and 4 is the outside option of the firm. Across these scenarios
at least, the outside option of the firm is therefore critical to firm entry.16 This is not
14 See the Appendix for further detail on these sources and the calculations made.
15 Appendix Figure 6 shows the computed value functions for each scenario.
16 Scenarios 1 and 3 differ in the outside option of the firm and the maximum tax constraint. However
imposing τ “ 721.25 from Scenario 1 in Scenario 3 does not change the entry outcome, hence entry is
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surprising, as a high outside option lowers the cost to the regulator of detering firm entry.
Contrasting these scenarios to the benchmark case of no transfer constraint shows the
loss in total payoffs associated with the existence of limited liability. The total starting
value in Scenario 2 (the sum of the regulator’s starting value and the firm’s starting
value) with limited liability is approximatly 11% lower (9,409 vs 10,588). In Scenario 3,
the loss is approximately 26% (32,846 vs 44,371). As the firm’s expected values are the
same across scenarios, this loss in welfare is experienced solely by the regulator.
When firms do enter, limited liability also results in a substantial net loss, and this
loss is entirely borne by the regulator. Table 2 shows that, in Scenarios 1 and 4, the
firm does better with constraints on the transfers it pays to the regulator. The total
difference in payoffs due to limited liability is approximately 50% in Scenario 1 and over
60% in Scenario 4.
Table 2 reports expected firm and regulator outcomes at t0. The probability of
exit and the volatility of transfers for t ą 0 are also important quantities. To explore
them, we simulate 10,000 Brownian motion paths dZjt , j “ 1, .., 10000. For each path,
or simulation j we calculate the evolution of the firm’s promised utility W jt and the
transfer flow dIjt . For every t, we then calculate the mean and standard deviation of
promised utility and transfer flows and the probability of exit by t “ 60. Figures 3
and 4 and Table 3 summarize the results.17 In each Figure, the left-hand panel plots
promised utility and the right-hand panels plots the transfer flow. Across scenarios we
plot the path of promised utility and transfers from the same simulated pollution path.
The mean and standard deviation of transfers over time18 are reported in Table 3 along
with the probability of exit.
Scenario 1 provides an example of where limited liability can lead to firm exit. In
Scenario 1 the probability of exit by t “ 60 is 10%, leading to the decline in the mean
promised utility in the left panel of Figure 3. The mean transfer from the firm to the
regulator as well as the volatility of the transfer are significantly higher without limited
not determined by the transfer constraint in this case either.
17 In the Appendix we also plot the mean regulator’s payoff across simulations and the single path of
the regulator’s payoff.
18 For each path j, we calculate the standard deviation of transfers, we then average this standard
deviation to generate a measure of the average volatility of transfers over time.
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liability. This difference in volatility is evidenced by the transfers plotted for a single
path of pollution for the two cases in the left hand panel of Figure 5. For this single path,
the unconstrained transfer from the firm to the regulator exceeds the limited liability
constraint 25% of the time.
In contrast, Scenario 4 provides an example where we observe no exit and the volatil-
ity of the transfers is approximately the same with or without limited liability. Figure
5 shows that the transfers are indeed very similar with or without a constraint on the
transfer. With high pollution volatility, a low outside option and a relatively high max-
imum tax constraint, the regulator maintains the firm’s promised value at the threshold
to minimize the chance of receiving a low payoff if the firm exits. Relative to the no
constraint case this is costly to the regulator and beneficial to the firm.
6 Conclusion
Firms who produce emissions that can be measured are the target of most environmental
regulation. Firms whose emissions cannot be measured also cause significant damage
but they remain relatively unregulated. We study a setting in which a regulator is tasked
with enforcing abatement when emissions from firms cause stochastic pollution.
If the regulator could observe emissions, then it would tax emitting firms. When
individual emissions are not observable but the regulator is unconstrained in its use of
incentives, the regulator charges firms when pollution increases, and provides rebates
when pollution decreases. This implies unboundedly large transfer flows from the firm to
the regulator after arbitrarily large positive shocks to pollution. In practice, regulators
cannot charge unboundedly large taxes but are constrained in the transfers they can
mandate from firms. These constraints realistically arise either from the political process
(e.g., as a result of industry lobbying) or as the result of credit constraints.
Our main contribution is to show that if the regulator faces a constraint on the
size of the tax it can levy, then it can exploit dynamic incentives to induce firms to
abate. To do so the regulator taxes a constant amount in the present and promises
future ambient rebates: expected rebates rise if ambient pollution decreases, and fall if
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ambient pollution increases.
We then use a numerical application to fracking to demonstrate the costs of these
constraints. We show that under constraints on the maximum tax, firm entry is lowered,
the probability of firm exit is raised and the delay of incentive payments, which is
necessary to motivate abatement, comes at significant cost to the regulator.
The mechanism we propose relies on polluting firms being taxed or rebated as a
function of ambient pollution levels, and being incentivized by the use of future rebates
that are contingent on current abatement actions. A reasonable question is whether such
a scheme is practical or politically feasible. The Everglades Forever Act, designed to
reduce phosphorous load into the Everglades Protection Area in Florida, suggests that
it is. Like our mechanism, the Everglades Forever Act imposes a minimum tax on agri-
cultural producers contributing to runoff into the Everglades, and provides reductions
in this tax if aggregate phosphorous reduction targets are met. The scheme also involves
a dynamic component, allowing current reductions to offset future tax payments.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Parameters for Fracking Application
Firm’s discount factor (γ) 0.1
Profit flow ($) (pii) 2,500
Unit abatement cost ($) (λ) 39,000
Regulator’s discount factor (r) 0.01
Weight on firm’s utility (φ) 0.5
Scenarios (1) (2) (3) (4)
Abatement level (mg/L) (A) 0.005 0.05 0.005 0.05
Volatility (mg/L) (σ) 0.025 0.03 0.025 0.03
Abatement cost ($) (c) 195 1,950 195 1,950
Outside option ($) (R) 17,288 5,225 21,898 4,125
Maximum transfer ($) (τ) 781.25 5,000 320 5,000
Notes: Table 1 reports the parameters for the application of the model to water pollution caused by
fracking. The top panel shows parameters that do not vary across scenario. The bottom panels shows
parameters that do vary across scenarios.
Table 2: Numerical Solution to Optimal Contract
Scenarios (1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfer constraint
Rebate threshold (xW ) 22,050 5,531 23,120 5,491
Regulator’s value at threshold (fpxW q) 21,026 2,461 10,415 2,835
Firm’s starting value (W0 “W˚) 20,467 5,225 21,898 4,546
Regulator’s starting value (fpW0q “ fpW˚q) 21,595 2,612 10,949 3,246
Total starting value (fpW0q `W0) 42,062 9,409 32,846 7,792
No transfer constraint
Regulator’s starting value (fpRq) 66,269 5,362 22,474 15,812
Firm’s starting value (W0 “ R) 17,288 5,225 21,898 4,125
Total starting value (fpW0q `W0) 83,556 10,588 44,371 19,938
Notes: The first panel of Table 2 reports computed values for the rebate threshold, the regulator’s value
at the rebate threshold, and both the firm and regulator’s starting values under a maximum transfer
or limited liability constraint. The second panel reports starting values when there is no such transfer
constraint. See Table 1 for scenario parameters.
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Table 3: Simulation Results
Scenarios (1) (4)
Transfer constraint
Mean transfer to firm (dI) -105 -4
SD transfer 636 1170
Probability of exit 0.1 0
No transfer constraint
Mean transfer to firm (dI) -576 -138
SD transfer 974 1169
Probability of exit 0 0
Notes: Table 3 reports the mean, standard deviation (SD) and probability of exit by t “ 60 from 10,000
simulations of the transfer payments and firm continuation values for Scenarios 1 and 4. See Table 1
for scenario parameters. The standard deviation measures the average volatility of transfers over time,
it is the mean of the standard deviation of transfer payments in each of the 10,000 simulations.
Figure 1: Regulator’s Value
Notes: Figure 1 depicts a stylized regulator’s value function.
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Figure 2: Contract Values
Notes: Figure 2 depicts the contract that links the firm’s payoffs to the pollution flow. The left panel
shows changes in the firm’s promised value given their current promised value and the pollution flow.
The right panel shows transfer flows to the firm given their current promised value and the pollution
flow.
Figure 3: Scenario 1 Firm’s Expected Payoff and Transfers
Notes: Figure 3 depicts results for simulations of Scenario 1. See Table 3 for the parameter values.
The left panel shows the firm’s mean expected payoff (dark dashed line) across 10,000 simulations of
pollution and a single pollution path (grey solid line). The right panel shows average transfers across
simulations (dark dashed line) and a single pollution path (grey solid line). Single pollution path is the
same across plots. In both plots, dotted lines are the mean of the variable +/- 1.96*standard deviation.
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Figure 4: Scenario 4 Firm’s Expected Payoff and Transfers
Notes: Figure 4 depicts results for Scenario 4. See Table 3 for the parameter values. The left panel
shows the firm’s mean expected payoff (dark dashed line) across 10,000 simulations of pollution and a
single pollution path (grey solid line). The right panel shows average transfers across simulations (dark
dashed line) and a single pollution path (grey solid line). Single pollution path is the same across plots.
In both plots, dotted lines are the mean of the variable +/- 1.96*standard deviation.
Figure 5: Transfers in Unconstrained Benchmark
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 4
Notes: Figure 5 shows transfers in the benchmark case without a transfer constraint for a single path
of pollution (solid line) and reproduces the transfer from the same pollution path for the model with a
transfer constraint (dashed line). Left hand panel shows transfers for Scenario 1, right hand panel shows
transfers for Scenario 4. Scenario parameters outlined in Table 3.
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Appendix
In all proofs in this appendix, to simplify notation we rescale time when firm i enters
so that with the new time scale ti0 “ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall from (4) that i’s promised utility, the total expected payoff
firm i receives from choosing abatement from time t after some history of reports and
choices ais, 0 ď s ď t, given that all other firms follow the recommended actions from
time t, is
W it “ Et
«ż T i
t
exp´γps´tq dΠispaisq ` exp´γpT i´tqR
ff
Consider the case where for 0 ď s ď t the firm follows the recommended actions and
abates (i.e., ais “ 1 @ 0 ď s ď t). It is sufficient to show that equation (9) holds for this
case (DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006). Define
V it “
»– tż
0
exp´γs dΠispais “ 1q ` exp´γtW it
fifl
Then V it is the total past and future expected payoff of the firm from action choice
ais “ 1 @ s P r0, ts. Indeed V it “ EtrV it`ss; the total past and future expected payoff
from choosing the abatement actions, where the expectation is taken over information
available at time t, is constant over time. In other words, V it is a martingale. By the
martingale representation theorem there is a process β˜it such that dV
i
t “ exp´γt β˜itdZt.
Differentiating V it with respect to t, and using the martingale property:
dV it “ exp´γt dΠitpait “ 1q ´ γ exp´γtW it dt` exp´γt dW it
exp´γt β˜itdZt “ exp´γt dΠitpait “ 1q ´ γ exp´γtW it dt` exp´γt dW it
dW it “ γW it dt´ dΠitpait “ 1q ` β˜itdZt
Now, letting β˜it “ βitσ, substituting for dYt from (1) with µt “ 0, and dΠit from (3) with
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ait “ 1:
dW it “ γW it dt´ ppii ´ ciqdt´ dIit ` βitdYt
The proof that βit ď ´λ is provided in the text.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that the regulator’s value function is separable.
Consider two firms i and j. By Lemma 2, when all firms abate the evolution of the
continuation value dW it is correlated with dW
j
t through the pollution shock σdZt but
W it does not depend directly on W
j
t . The regulator therefore cannot gain by linking
the payoffs of the firms and will choose to adjust dIi and dW i independently of dIj and
dW j ; that is, the regulator’s value function is separable in W it and W
j
t .
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With separability we can focus on the regulator’s instantaneous value from firm i,
rf ipW iqdt. Rescale time so that firm i’s chance of entering occurs at ti0 “ 0 and define
Git as the total regulator’s payoff from firm i up to and from time t, conditional on firm
i entering and not exiting before t:
Git “
tż
0
´ exp´rs dIis ` exp´rt f ipW it q ` p1´ φqpW i0 ´ exp´rtW it q (16)
Differentiating with respect to time and applying Ito’s Lemma:
exprt dGit ` rf ipW it qdt “´ dIit ` f iW ipW it qdW it `
1
2
pσβitq2f iW iW ipW it qdt
` p1´ φqrW it dt´ p1´ φqdW it (17)
Under the optimal policy dGit is a martingale and hence its expected value is zero. Thus
19 The separability of the value function relies on the assumption that the recommended actions of
active firms (abatement) are independent of the total number of active or exited firms. Without this
assumption, the expected stopping time EpT jq and the incentives dIjt of firm j may affect firm i’s
recommended actions or incentive compatibility constraint and separability may fail.
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we have:
rf ipW it qdt “ ´
`
dIit ` dW it
˘``φ` f iW ipW it q˘ dW it`12pσβitq2f iW iW ipW it qdt`p1´φqrW it dt
(18)
Let xW i be the lowest value of W i ě R such that f i
W i
pxW iq “ ´φ (the value matching
condition). Optimality of the threshold xW i requires that the slope of the value function
f i be constant at xW i; that is, f i
W iW i
pxW iq “ 0 (the super contact condition; e.g., see
Dumas, 1991). Replacing the value matching and the super contact conditions into (18)
and using equation (9) yields the condition
rf ipxW iqdt “ ppii ´ ciqdt`xW i rp1´ φqr ´ γs dt (19)
To prove the concavity of f ipW iq in
”
R,xW iı, it is sufficient to show that f i
W iW i
pW iq ă
0 for all W i such that R ďW i ă xW i. We first show that for R ďW i ă xW i:
rf ipW iq `W ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq ă pii ´ ci (20)
Condition (20) states that the flow payoff of the regulator plus the expected flow utility
of firm i net of the flow payoff of the regulator due to firm i must be less than the flow
value of the firm’s production net of abatement cost. To verify this intuitive condition
we use the fact that f i
W i
pW iq ą ´φ for W i ă xW i and equation (19).
We wish to evaluate rf ipW iq `W ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq for W i ă xW i. Taking a first order
Taylor approximation, for small ∆ ą 0 we have that fpxW i´∆q « f ipxW iq´∆f i
W i
pxW i´
∆q. As f i
W i
pxW i´∆q ą ´φ, it is f ipxW i´∆q ă f ipxW iq`∆φ. Then, letting W i “ xW i´∆,
(20) follows, as it must be:
rf ipxW i ´∆q ` pxW i ´∆qpγ ´ p1´ φqrq ă rpf ipxW iq `∆φq ` pxW i ´∆qpγ ´ p1´ φqrq
“ rf ipxW iq `xW ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq ´∆pγ ´ rq
ă rf ipxW iq `xW ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq
“ pii ´ ci,
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where the second inequality comes from γ ą r and the last equality uses (19).
Substituting (9) into (18), taking expectations and re-arranging, we can write the
regulator’s value function from firm i for W it ă xW as:
rf ipW it q “ ´ φdIit ` f iW ipW it qpγW it ´ ppii ´ ciq ´ dIitq
` p1´ φqppr ´ γqW it ` pii ´ ciq ` 12pβ
i
tσq2f iW iW ipW it q (21)
Hence, for R ďW i ă xW i we have:
pσβiq2
2
f iW iW ipW iq “ rf ipW iq ` φdIit ´ f iW ipW iqpγW i ´ ppii ´ ciq ´ dIitq
´ p1´ φq “pr ´ γqW i ` ppii ´ ciq‰
ď rf ipW iq ` φdIit ` φpγiW i ´ ppii ´ ciq ´ dIitq
´ p1´ φq “pr ´ γqW i ` ppii ´ ciq‰
“ rf ipW iq `W ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq ´ ppii ´ ciq
ă 0
The first inequality follows from f i
W i
pW iq ě ´φ and γW i´ ppii´ ciq ´ dIitq ą 0 and the
second inequality follows from (20). Hence for R ďW i ď xW i the function f i is strictly
concave.
Proof of Proposition 1. The regulator chooses dIit and dW
i
t to maximize the rhs of
(18), or (21), subject to dIit ě ´τdt and equation (9) in Lemma 2, which can be written
as dW it ` dIit “ γW it dt´ ppii ´ ciqdt` βitdYt.
By Lemma 3, f i is concave for W it ă xW i. Since, by definition, f iW ipxW iq “ ´φ (the
value matching condition), when W it ă xW i it must be f iW ipW it qdt ą ´φ; thus, the rhs of
(18) is increasing in dW it and by (9) it is decreasing in dI
i
t . It follows that when W
i
t ă xW i
it is optimal to set dIit “ ´τdt and hence, by (9), dW it “ τ`γW it dt´ppii´ciqdt`βitdYt.
On the contrary, the concavity of f i implies that when W it ě xW i the rhs of (18) is
(weakly) decreasing in W it , since f
i
W i
pW it q “ ´φ. Thus, the regulator is better off by
not letting firm i’s promised utility exceed xW i. This has two implications.
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First, it cannot be that W i
ti0
ą xW i when firm i first enters. Since it cannot be that
W i
ti0
ă R either (firm i cannot receive less than its outside option), it must be that
R ďW i
ti0
ď xW i. This proves part (a) of the proposition.
Second, if at time t ą ti0, W it “ xW i the regulator must make sure that dW it ď 0. By
(9) in order to ensure that dW it ď 0 at W it “ xW i it must be:
dIit “ max
!
´τdt, γxW idt´ ppii ´ ciqdt` βitdYt)
dW it “ min
!
0, γxW idt´ ppii ´ ci ´ τqdt` βitdYt)
To conclude the proof of parts (c) and (d) and prove part (b) of the proposition, we need
to show that βit “ ´λ.
Since f i is strictly concave in W it , f
i
W iW i
pW it q ă 0 for W it ă xW i, the regulator will
seek to minimize the magnitude of βit subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
βit ď ´λ. Hence βit “ ´λ and for W it ă xW i (21) becomes:
rf ipW it q “φτ ` f iW ipW it qpγW it ´ ppii ´ ciq ` τq
` p1´ φqppr ´ γqW it ` ppii ´ ciq ` 12pλσq
2f iW iW ipW it q (22)
Lemma 4 shows that there is a unique solution to the boundary value problem defined
by (22) with boundary conditions f ipRq “ p1´ φqR and f ipxW iq “ pii´ci´pγ´p1´φqrqxW ir .
Lemma 4. There is a unique solution to the boundary value problem defined by (22)
with boundary conditions f ipRq “ p1´ φqR and f ipxW iq “ pii´ci´pγ´p1´φqrqxW ir .
Proof. Consider the family of initial value problems defined by (22) with initial condi-
tions f ipRq “ p1´φqR and f i
W i
pRq “ k with k ě ´1. Since it has bounded derivatives,
the value function f ipW iq on the left hand side of (22) is Lipschitz continuous. Then,
by a standard result in the theory of ordinary differential equations (e.g., see Hirsh
and Smale, 1974, Theorem 1, page 162) the initial value problem has a unique global
solution, which is continuous in φ, R and k.
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Any solution of the boundary value problem must be the solution of an initial value
problem with f i
W i
pRq “ k for some k ě ´φ. We will argue that there exists a unique
k “ k˚ for which the solution of the boundary value problem coincides with the solution
of the initial value problem. First we will prove a few preliminary claims. The first
claim says that the slope of the solution of the initial value problem with a greater slope
at R has a greater slope at all W i ď xW i.
Claim 1. Let f ip¨; kq be the solution of the initial value problem defined by (22) with
initial conditions f ipRq “ p1 ´ φqR and f i
W i
pRq “ k. If k ą k1, then f i
W i
pW i; kq ą
f i
W i
pW i; k1q for all W i P rR,xW iq.
Proof of the Claim. The proof is by contradiction. Let k ą k1; by definition f i
W i
pR; kq ą
f i
W i
pR; k1q. Suppose that, contrary to the claim, there is a ĂW i such that: (i) f i
W i
pW i; kq ą
f i
W i
pW i; k1q for W i ă ĂW i, (ii) f i
W i
pĂW i; kq “ f i
W i
pĂW i; k1q, and (iii) f i
W i
pW i; kq ă
f i
W i
pW i; k1q for ĂW i ăW i ă ĂW i`δ, for some δ ą 0. First note that (i) and (ii) imply: (iv)
f ipĂW i; kq ą f ipĂW i; k1q. Second, observe that (ii), (iv) and (22) imply f i
W iW i
pĂW i; kq ą
f i
W iW i
pĂW i; k1q, or equivalently, f iWi pĂW i`ε;kq´f iWi pĂW i;kqε ą f iWi pĂW i`ε;k1q´f iWi pĂW i;k1qε for a
sufficiently small ε. The latter inequality together with (ii) implies f i
W i
pĂW i ` ε; kq ą
f i
W i
pĂW i ` ε; k1q, contradicting (iii) and concluding the proof of the claim.
Define the function:
gipW iq “ pi
i ´ ci ´ pγ ´ p1´ φqrqW i
r
(23)
Next, observe that, by (19), for the solution f ipW i; kq of an initial value problem also
to be a solution of the boundary value problem it is necessary that there exists a xW i
such that f ipxW i; kq “ gipxW iq and f i
W i
pxW i; kq “ ´φ; that is f ip¨; kq crosses gip¨q at slope
´φ. The next claim shows that such a condition is also sufficient, as the solution of the
initial value problem that satisfies it is strictly concave to the left of xW i and hence xW i
is the lowest value of W i such that f i
W i
pW iq “ ´φ.
Claim 2. Let f ip¨; kq be the solution of the initial value problem defined by (22) with
initial conditions f ipRq “ p1´φqR and f i
W i
pRq “ k. If for some xW i it is f i
W i
pxW i; kq ě
40
´φ, f ipxW i; kq “ gipxW iq and f ipW i; kq ă gipW iq for all W i P rR,xW iq, then f ipW i; kq
is strictly concave for all W i P rR,xW iq.
Proof of the Claim. Observe that (22) can be written as
r
“
f ipW i; kq ´ gipW iq‰ “ “φ` f iW ipW i; kq‰ “τ ´ rgipW iq ` p1´ φqrW i‰` pλσq22 f iW iW ipW iq
(24)
Note that
“
τ ´ rgipW iq ` p1´ φqrW i‰ ą 0 by Lemma 1. Hence, f i
W i
pW i; kq ě ´φ and
f ipW i; kq ă gipW iq imply f i
W iW i
pW i; kq ă 0. It only remains to show that f i
W i
pxW i; kq ě
´φ and (24) imply f i
W i
pW i; kq ě ´φ for all W i P rR,xW iq. Using a first order Taylor’s
approximation, we have: f i
W i
pW i´ε; kq “ f i
W i
pW i; kq´εf i
W iW i
pW i; kq`opεq. ConsiderxW i´ε for an arbitrarily small ε. As the left hand side of (24) is negative and f i
W i
pxW i´
ε; kq “ ´φ` opεq, it is immediate that f i
W iW i
pxW i ´ ε; kq ă 0. An analogous argument
shows, more generally, that f i
W iW i
pW i; kq ă 0 implies that f i
W iW i
pW i´ ε; kq ă 0 for all
W i P pR,xW is, concluding the proof of the claim.
We now show that for k sufficiently large the solution f ip¨; kq of the initial value
problem has positive slope when it crosses gip¨q and hence cannot be a solution of the
boundary value problem.
Claim 3. Let f ip¨; kq be the solution of the initial value problem defined by (22) with
initial conditions f ipRq “ p1 ´ φqR and f i
W i
pRq “ k. There exists sk such that for
some xW i it is f i
W i
pxW i;skq ą 0, f ipxW i;skq “ gipxW iq and f ipW i;skq ă gipW iq for all
W i P rR,xW iq.
Proof of the Claim. Using a first order Taylor’s approximation, we have: f ipR` ε; kq “
f ipR; kq ` εf i
W i
pR; kq ` opεq “ p1´ φqR` εk` opεq. By choosing k “ sk “ gipRq´p1´φqRε ,
we can make sure that f ipR` ε;skq “ gipRq ` opεq ą gipR` εq. Since f ipR;skq ă gipRq,
by continuity of f ip¨;skq there must exists a xW i such that f ipxW i;skq “ gipxW iq and
f ipW i;skq ă gipW iq for all W i P rR,xW iq. To conclude the proof of the claim, we
only need to show that f i
W i
pxW i;skq ą 0, or, taking a first order Taylor approxima-
tion, f i
W i
pxW i;skq “ f i
W i
pR;skq ` pxW i ´ Rqf i
W iW i
pxW i;skq ` opxW i ´ Rq ą 0. This follows
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from recalling that f i
W i
pR;skq “ sk, xW i ´ R ă ε, and that by (24) f i
W iW i
pxW i;skq “
2
pλσq2
”
rgipxW iq ´ p1´ φqrxW i ´ τı ”φ` f i
W i
pxW i;skqı.
We now consider k “ ´φ and show that f ip¨;´φq cannot first cross gip¨q at a slope
greater than or equal to ´φ (and hence cannot be a solution of the boundary value
problem). Suppose, to the contrary, that f i
W i
pxW i;´φq ě ´φ, f ipxW i;´φq “ gipxW iq and
f ipW i;´φq ă gipW iq for all W i P rR,xW iq. Then by Claim 2 f ip¨;´φq must be linear
with slope ´φ, as it must be concave and it has slope ´φ at R by definition. However
the left hand side of (24) is negative for W i ă xW i, which implies that f ip¨;´φq must be
strictly concave, a contradiction.
We now conclude the proof of the lemma by showing that there must be a unique
solution of the initial value problem that crosses gip¨q at slope ´φ. There are two cases.
First, f ip¨;´φq crosses gip¨q at a slope less than ´φ. Then by continuity in k of the
solutions of the initial value problem and Claims 1 and 3, there exists a unique k “ k˚
for which the solution of the boundary value problem coincides with the solution of the
initial value problem. Second, f ip¨;´φq never crosses gip¨q. Then it must be the case
that its slope, as W i goes to infinity, is bounded above by the slope of gip¨q, ´γr ` 1´ φ
which is less that ´φ. Appealing again to the continuity in k of the solutions of the
initial value problem and Claims 1 and 3, we can conclude first that there there exists a
k˜ for which f ip¨; k˜q first crosses gip¨q with slope approximately equal to ´γr `1´φ ă ´φ
and then that there exists a unique k “ k˚ ą k˜ for which the solution of the boundary
value problem coincides with the solution of the initial value problem.
Proof of Proposition 2. Lemma 2 applies. In addition (18) holds, as in the proof of
Proposition 1. Without a transfer constraint the regulator only faces the constraint that
firm i exits when W it ă R. Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1,
the regulator’s problem is to choose dIit to maximize the right hand side of (22) without
the constraint dIit ě ´τdt. For the regulator’s problem to have a solution, it must then
be f i
W i
pW iq “ ´φ for all W i ě R. We can thus conclude that the upper threshold on
the promised utility is xW i “ R. Further, if f i
W i
pW iq “ ´φ then the starting promised
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utility is also R, W i˚ “ W iti0 “ R. The regulator keeps the promised utility of firm i
constant at R; that is, dW it “ 0 for all t ą 0. Imposing this and W it “ R in (9), the
expression for dW i, yields:
dIit “ pγR´ ppii ´ ciqqdt` βitdYt (25)
and the regulator is indifferent to βi subject to the incentive compatibility condition
βi ď ´λ. Finally, imposing f i
W i
pW iq “ ´φ and f i
W iW i
pW iq “ 0 and evaluating (22) at
W i “ R yields
rf ipRq “ pii ´ ci ` p1´ φqrR´ γR (26)
Proof of Proposition 3 (a). As shown by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) (see their
Lemmas 4 and 6), by using the envelope theorem and differentiating the HJB equation
(22) and its boundary conditions, we can derive expressions for the change in the regu-
lator’s value as a result of a change in the parameters. We first determine the effect of
a change in τ , σ and R, as the signs of these effects are immediate:
Bf ipW iq
Bτ “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtpφ` f iW ipW it qqdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl ě 0 (27)
Bf ipW iq
Bσ “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtσpλq2f iW iW ipW it qqdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl ď 0 (28)
Bf ipW iq
BR “ E
”
e´rT ip1´ φq | W i0 “W i
ı
ą 0 (29)
Note that the weak inequalities in (27) and (28) are strict if xW i ą R.
To see that Bf
ipW iq
Bγ ă 0, Bf
ipW iq
Bpii ą 0 and Bf
ipW iq
BAi ă 0, we use the argument of
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Suppose that firm i were either: (i) more patient, with
true discount rate γ1 ă γ, (ii) had a higher profit flow pii1 ą pii, or (iii) had a lower
abatement cost Ai
1 ă Ai, but they were offered the contract designed for a firm with
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discount rate γ, flow profit pi and abatement cost Ai. Then the firm would be better
off while the regulator would have the same value. This can be seen by noting that the
firm’s transfer dIit at
xW i in (14) increases in γ and Ai “ ciλ and decreases in pii; hence
the firm’s transfer under the “wrong” parameters is higher than needed to maintain
the promised utility flow and incentives for the true parameters. The contract for the
“wrong” parameters is not optimal, as the regulator may reduce the value to the firm
while preserving their participation and their incentive constraints. Hence it must be
that the value to the regulator increases as the discount rate of the firm decreases, the
profit flow increases or the abatement cost decreases.
To show that Bf
ipW iq
Bλ ă 0, we derive the expressions for Bf
ipW iq
BAi and
Bf ipW iq
Bλ and use
the fact that the former is less than zero.
Bf ipW iq
BAi “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtλpf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqqdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl (30)
Bf ipW iq
Bλ “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rt
“
Aipf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqq ` σ2λf iW iW ipW it q
‰
dt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl
“ A
i
λ
Bf ipW iq
BAi ` E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtσ2λf iW iW ipW it qdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl ă 0 (31)
For future use, we also derive the following expressions:
Bf ipW iq
Bpii “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtpp1´ φq ´ f iW ipW it qqdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl (32)
Bf ipW iq
Bγ “ E
»—–T
iż
0
e´rtW it pf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqqdt | W i0 “W i
fiffifl (33)
Proof of Proposition 3 (b).
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We can derive expressions for the effect of parameters on the threshold xW by differ-
entiating the boundary condition rfpxW iq `xW ipγ ´ p1´ φqrq “ pii ´ ci with respect to
each parameter. For any θ ‰ r we have:
r
Bf ipxW iq
Bθ `
”
rf iW ipxW iq ` γ ´ p1´ φqrı BxW iBθ `xW i Bpγ ´ p1´ φqrqBθ “ Bppii ´ λAiqBθ
which yields, after using f i
W i
pxW iq “ ´φ and rearranging:
pγ ´ rqBxW iBθ “ ´rBf ipxW iqBθ ´xW i Bpγ ´ p1´ φqrqBθ ` Bppii ´ λAiqBθ
By Proposition 3 (a), the signs of the effect of changes in τ , σ and R are immediate:
BxW i
Bτ “
´r
γ ´ r
«
Bf ipxW iq
Bτ
ff
ď 0 (34)
BxW i
Bσ “
´r
γ ´ r
«
Bf ipxW iq
Bσ
ff
ě 0 (35)
BxW i
BR “
´r
γ ´ r
«
Bf ipxW iq
BR
ff
ă 0 (36)
From (32), observe that Bf
ipxW iq
Bpii ď 1´e
´rTi
r and hence
BxW i
Bpii “
1
γ ´ r
«
1´ rBf
ipxW iq
Bpii
ff
ą 0 (37)
From (33), observe that Bf
ipxW iq
Bγ ě ´
xW ip1´e´rTi q
r and hence :
BxW i
Bγ “
´1
γ ´ r
«xW i ` rBf ipxW iqBγ
ff
ă 0 (38)
From (30), observe that Bf
ipxW iq
BAi ě ´λp1´e
´rTi q
r and hence :
BxW i
BAi “
´1
γ ´ r
«
λ` rBf
ipxW iq
BAi
ff
ă 0 (39)
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Finally, note from (31) that there is no simple lower bound on Bf
ipxW iq
Bλ , as it depends
on the curvature of the value function f i
W iW i
and hence the following expression is
indeterminate:
BxW i
Bλ “
´1
γ ´ r
«
Ai ` rBf
ipxW iq
Bλ
ff
(40)
Proof of Proposition 3 (c).
The optimality condition for the choice of W i˚ is f iW ipW i˚q “ 0. Differentiating with
respect to any parameter θ gives:
BW i˚
Bθ “
´1
f i
W iW i
pW i˚q
¨ BBW i
ˆBf ipW i˚q
Bθ
˙
Thus, to evaluate the effect of a change in the parameter θ we need to compare
Bf ipW i˚q
Bθ with
Bf ipW i0qBθ for W
i
0 P rW i˚ ´ ,W i˚ ` s.
First observe that the constant 1 ´ φ in (29) is positive. Since an increase in W i0
from W i˚ to W i˚ `  increases the stopping time T i (the time at which W it goes belows
R and the firm exits); it immediately follows that
BW i˚
BR ą 0.
From now on, define pt i as the first time that the process W it starting at W i0 reaches
W i˚.
Using (27) we may write:
Bf ipW iq
Bτ “ E
»—– pt
iż
0
e´rtpφ` f iW ipW it qqdt` e´rpt i Bf ipW i˚qBτ | W i0 “W i
fiffifl
There are two cases. Suppose first that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bτ ą pφ`f iW ipW i˚qq “ φ. Take W i0 “W i˚`.
Then, since f i
W i
pW iq ă 0 for W i ą W i˚, we have that Bf
ipW i˚q
Bτ ą pφ ` f iW ipW it qq for all
t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBτ ą Bf ipW i˚`qBτ . Second, suppose that Bf ipW i˚qBτ ă φ. Take W i0 “
W i˚ ´ . Then, since f iW ipW iq ě 0 for W i ďW i˚, we have that Bf
ipW i˚q
Bτ ă pφ` f iW ipW it qq
for all t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBτ ă Bf ipW i˚´qBτ . From the two cases we can thus conclude
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that BBW i
´Bf ipW i˚q
Bτ
¯
ă 0 and hence BW i˚Bτ ă 0.
Using (33) we have:
Bf ipW iq
Bγ “ E
»—– pt
iż
0
e´rtW it pf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqqdt` e´rpt i Bf ipW i˚qBγ | W i0 “W i
fiffifl
There are two cases. Suppose first that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bγ ą W i˚pf iW ipW i˚q ´ p1 ´ φqq. Take
W i0 “ W i˚ ` . Then, since W ipf iW ipW iq ´ p1 ´ φqq is decreasing in W i for W i ě W i˚,
we have that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bγ ą W it pf iW ipW it q ´ p1 ´ φqq for all t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBγ ą
Bf ipW i˚`q
Bγ . Second, suppose that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bγ ăW i˚pf iW ipW i˚q´p1´φqq “ ´p1´φqW i˚. Take
W i0 “ W i˚ ´ . Then, since W if iW ipW iq ě 0 for W i ď W i˚, we have that Bf
ipW i˚q
Bγ ă
W it pf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqq for all t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBγ ă Bf ipW i˚´qBγ . From the two
cases we can thus conclude that BBW i
´Bf ipW i˚q
Bγ
¯
ă 0 and hence BW i˚Bγ ă 0.
Using (32) we have:
Bf ipW iq
Bpii “ E
»—– pt
iż
0
e´rtpp1´ φq ´ f iW ipW it qqdt` e´rpt i Bf ipW i˚qBpii | W i0 “W i
fiffifl
Here there are also two cases. Suppose first that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bpii ă p1 ´ φq ´ f iW ipW i˚q. Take
W i0 “ W i˚ ` . Then, since p1 ´ φq ´ f iW ipW iq is increasing in W i, we have that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bpii ă p1 ´ φq ´ f iW ipW it q for all t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBpii ă Bf ipW i˚`qBpii . Second,
suppose that
Bf ipW i˚q
Bpii ą p1 ´ φq ´ f iW ipW i˚q “ p1 ´ φq. Take W i0 “ W i˚ ´ . Then,
since f i
W i
pW iq ě 0 for W i ď W i˚, we have that Bf
ipW i˚q
Bpii ą p1 ´ φq ´ f iW ipW it q for all
t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBpii ą Bf ipW i˚´qBpii . From the two cases we can thus conclude that
B
BW i
´Bf ipW i˚q
Bpii
¯
ą 0 and hence BW i˚Bpii ą 0.
Using (30) we have:
Bf ipW iq
BAi “ E
»—– pt
iż
0
e´rtλpf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqqdt` e´rpt i Bf ipW i˚qBAi | W i0 “W i
fiffifl
Proceding as before, suppose first that
Bf ipW i˚q
BAi ą λpf iW ipW i˚q ´ p1 ´ φqq. Take W i0 “
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W i˚`. Then, since λpf iW ipW iq´p1´φqq is decreasing in W i for W i ěW i˚, we have that
Bf ipW i˚q
BAi ą λpf iW ipW it q´p1´φqq for all t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBAi ą Bf ipW i˚`qBAi . Second,
suppose that
Bf ipW i˚q
BAi ă λpf iW ipW i˚q ´ p1´ φqq “ ´λp1´ φq. Take W i0 “W i˚ ´ . Then,
since λf i
W i
pW iq ě 0 for W i ďW i˚, we have that Bf
ipW i˚q
BAi ă λpf iW ipW it q ´ p1´ φqq for all
t P r0,pt is and hence Bf ipW i˚qBAi ă Bf ipW i˚´qBAi . From the two cases we can thus conclude that
B
BW i
´Bf ipW i˚q
BAi
¯
ă 0 and hence BW i˚BAi ă 0.
Finally note from (28) and (31) that Bf
ipW iq
Bσ and
Bf ipW iq
Bλ depend on the curvature
of the value function f i
W iW i
and thus the impact of changes in σ and λ on W i˚ are
indeterminate.
Details for the Simulation Scenarios in Section 5
To parameterize profits and abatment costs we use the following information:
• Annual industry revenue 3.5B « 1.6M per fracking well. 20
• Costs of well construction of 5M.21
• Average well lasts 7.5 years.22
• Daily revenue versus levelised daily costs « 2.5K daily profit.
• Average pay in the PA oil and gas industry 142K « $390 per day.
20 http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/pa-gas-drilling-brought-3-5-billion-in-2011-1.1311378
21 http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/pa-gas-drilling-brought-3-5-billion-in-2011-1.1311378
22 http://www.marcellus-shale.us/marcellus-production.htm
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Figure 6: Regulator’s Value Function
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2
(c) Scenario 3 (d) Scenario 4
Notes: Figure 6 shows a computed regulator’s value function for each the scenarios outlined in Table
3.
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Figure 7: Regulator’s Value in Simulations, Scenario 1
Notes: Figure 7 depicts the regulator’s value for Scenario 1. The left hand panel shows the mean
regulator’s value. Dotted lines are the mean of the regulator’s value +/- 1.96*standard deviation. The
right hand panel shows the regulator’s value for a single simulation. Parameters for the simulations can
be found in Table 3.
Figure 8: Regulator’s Value in Simulations, Scenario 4
Notes: Figure 8 depicts the regulator’s value for Scenario 1. The left hand panel shows the mean
regulator’s value. Dotted lines are the mean of the regulator’s value +/- 1.96*standard deviation. The
right hand panel shows the regulator’s value for a single simulation. Parameters for the simulations can
be found in Table 3.
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